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Freedom and the Value of Games 
This essay explores the features in virtue of which games are valuable or 
worthwhile to play. The difficulty view of games holds that the goodness of 
games lies in their difficulty: by making activities more complex or making 
them require greater effort, they structure easier activities into more difficult, 
therefore more worthwhile, activities. I argue that a further source of the value 
of games is that they provide players with an experience of freedom, which 
they provide both as paradigmatically unnecessary activities and by offering 
opportunities for relatively unconstrained choice inside the “lusory” world that 
players inhabit. 
Keywords: aesthetics; ethics; games; freedom; achievement 
1. Introduction 
What makes playing games—board games, computer games, role playing games and 
so forth—valuable or worthwhile? Many activities are valuable because they aim at 
some valuable end or because they are required by duty, but, by their nature, games 
aim at trivial ends (like capturing all of an opponent’s checkers) and are played “for 
fun” rather than out of duty. So what, if anything, makes playing games a worthwhile 
activity? The difficulty view of games argues that the goodness of games lies in their 
difficulty. Two leading proponents of the difficulty view, Thomas Hurka (2006) and 
Gwen Bradford (2015), have different views about what makes an activity difficult—
for Hurka difficulty is a matter of an activity’s complexity, while for Bradford it is a 
matter of the amount of intense effort that an activity requires. Both, however, think 
that games are valuable because they structure less difficult activities into more 
difficult, and therefore more worthwhile activities. A game turns something easy—like 
putting a ball through a relatively small hoop—into something hard—like scoring a 
basket in a game of basketball. The difficulty view captures an important feature of 
how games succeed, but it narrows the standards of success too much. While it is true 
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that we often want the games we play to be hard and feel a sense of achievement 
when we accomplish something difficult, an important part of the value of games is 
their ability to provide their players with an experience of freedom. Games provide 
this experience of freedom both as paradigmatically unnecessary activities and by 
providing opportunities for relatively unconstrained choice inside the lusory world 
that players inhabit when they play. 
I develop my argument through, first, a conceptual analysis of games that 
relies on Bernard Suits’s canonical definition of games and, second, a description of 
the phenomenology of games that provide their players with an experience of 
freedom using a variety of formal techniques. I then argue that the difficulty view 
should be amended to reflect the centrality of the experience of freedom to the value 
of games: while difficulty is a feature of most good games, games can also be good in 
another dimension understood in terms of the sort of freedom that they offer to 
players. Finally, I suggest that the experience of freedom in playing a game has the 
potential to provide larger social advantages beyond the benefits that they provide to 
individual players. 
2. The Difficulty View 
Why do we admire people who play games well, even though games concern trivial 
ends? The difficulty view argues that we admire achievements, and that what makes 
achievements valuable is, in large part, their difficulty. One variant of the difficulty 
view, advanced by Hurka, regards the difficulty of games as a matter of “how complex 
or physically challenging they are, or how much skill and ingenuity they require” 
(Hurka 2006, 221). Another variant, advanced by Bradford, regards difficulty as a 
matter of how much intense effort an activity requires and how long the intense effort 
lasts (Bradford 2015, 49). For both variants of the difficulty view, a bad game is one 
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that is insufficiently difficult, like tic-tac-toe, while a good game is one that is hard to 
succeed at, like chess, and the value of playing games lies in their difficulty. I focus on 
Hurka’s articulation of the difficulty view, rather than Bradford’s, because Hurka aims 
explicitly to account for what makes games valuable, while Bradford aims primarily to 
explain the nature and value of achievement. 
Like many contemporary philosophers of games, Hurka begins with the 
conceptual framework provided by Bernard Suits, who defines a game as the 
“voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 1990, 41). Suitsian game 
players regards their playing of a game (although not their decisions within a game) 
as not necessitated in advance for, if they saw their playing as predetermined, they 
could not regard it as voluntary. They also regard their playing of a game as 
intrinsically worthwhile, because one plays a game for its own sake rather than as an 
instrument for some further end (Suits 1990, 172).  
Hurka largely accepts Suits’s definition, but he focuses his argument more 
narrowly on the particular sort of game-play that Suits argues would constitute the 
primary activity of a utopia, which is play “for its own sake” (Suits 1990, 144, 166; 
Hurka 2006, 227). Thus, Hurka does not focus on games played by professionals. 
Professionals can play games, provided that they accept the rules of the game in order 
to play it (Suits 1990, 146); however, such professionals are not engaged in the 
narrower activity of game-play unless they are engaged in that activity for its own 
sake.1 
Hurka also begins with the premises that more difficult activities are more 
valuable than less difficult ones and that difficulty is primarily a matter of complexity. 
“More complex means-end relations make for more value in achievement” because 
such activities are harder to succeed at and require a greater degree of deliberative 
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skill to monitor how sub-activities conduce to the achievement of an overarching goal 
(Hurka 2006, 224).2 
Hurka further argues that the exclusive source of games’ value is their 
difficulty, arguing that “when two activities are equally complex and difficult” (their 
complexity and difficulty being a source of their intrinsic value), an activity that 
“produces an intrinsically good result” is superior in value to one that does not (Hurka 
2006, 233). So, “political activity that liberates an entire nation from oppression” is of 
greater value (in at least one respect), and is due greater honor and admiration, than 
winning a chess tournament (Hurka 2006, 233). Overthrowing a tyrant is of greater 
value than defeating a chess champion because it is both instrumentally better, in that 
it produces a separate intrinsic good, and intrinsically better on that basis. Hurka 
argues for this conclusion using Derek Parfit’s example of someone who spends her 
life trying to preserve Venice’s canals. On Hurka’s view, if, after that person’s death, 
Venice is preserved as a result of her efforts the person will have achieved something 
difficult. For this reason, her life will have been better and more valuable than if 
Venice were destroyed (Hurka 2006, 233).  
Hurka claims that there are two grounds for this conclusion. First, realizing the 
topmost goal in a hierarchy adds value to that hierarchy by making it more 
complicated. But if we consider activities at are truly equivalent in complexity, we are 
left with Hurka’s second ground: “when an activity aimed at a valuable end 
successfully achieves that end and therefore is instrumentally good, its being 
instrumentally good is an extra source of intrinsic value”  (Hurka 2006, 233). If I work 
at a difficult activity that has an intrinsically valuable end, like sending the dictator 
packing, and I achieve that end, my activity is more difficult and valuable than it 
would have been if I had worked at the same activity and it failed or if I had succeed at 
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an activity that were equally difficult but had a trivial end. Because of the general 
principle that if something is intrinsically good then “desiring, pursuing, and taking 
pleasure in it for that property, is also, and separately, intrinsically good” (Hurka 2006, 
228), aiming at and achieving an independently valuable end adds to the intrinsic 
value of the activity that aims at this end. 
Thus in Hurka’s view, (1) games are valuable because they transform less 
difficult (and complex) activities into more difficult (and complex) activities, (2) more 
difficult (and complex) games are better than less difficult (and complex) games, and 
(3) a game (undertaken solely for its intrinsic value) is less valuable than an activity of 
exactly equivalent difficulty (and complexity) that aims at and achieves an 
independently valuable end.3 
3. The Openness of Games 
The difficulty view is counterintuitive in some respects. Many game scholars find 
Suits’s definition of games unsatisfying because of its strained accounts of game-
playing by professionals and of games that players are not clearly trying to win, like 
playing “house” (Nguyen 2017b, 6). Nonetheless, Suits’s definition clearly captures 
some of the most important features of games: their rule-boundedness, voluntariness, 
and removal from everyday life. Because it provides a promising, if procrustean, 
approach to understanding games, and because of its prominence in philosophical 
literature and games studies literature, I accept and work within Suits’s definition for 
the remainder of this essay. Like Hurka, I also focus my argument narrowly on game-
play undertaken “for its own sake,” rather than professional play. 
In this section, I argue that—even if one source of games’ value lies in their 
difficulty—another significant source of the value of games is the opportunity that 
they provide to their players of participating in an activity that is not required by any 
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duty or reason. Although the activity of playing a game does not aim directly at this 
experience, the fact that the practice of game playing allows players to have such an 
experience adds to the intrinsic value of playing games.4 My argument proceeds in 
two parts: first, I argue that the nature of games is such that anything that counts as a 
“game” must provide its players with some minimal experience of freedom in playing 
the game. Second, I argue that, in practice, many games attract players by providing 
more robust experiences of freedom to their players as they play the game.5 
3.1 Experiences of Freedom 
Before I begin my argument, I will briefly explain what I mean by “experiences of 
freedom.” Sometimes I have a feeling that the future of my life is open, rather than 
closed, that the possible paths into the future that stretch out before me are 
uncountable, and that I could do or become anything. I feel free. This experience of 
freedom is part of a family of cognate experiences, feelings, moods, and attitudes, 
which encompasses the sense that my life is open before me, the attitude that I hold 
when I regard an activity as “free time” or “leisure” rather than work, a feeling of 
refuge that I might find in privacy, a feeling of relief at not having to do things that I 
want to avoid, the sense of a beginning when I set out on an adventure, the 
excitement of discovery, a mood of spontaneity, and the attitude that I have toward 
my art when I creatively make aesthetic objects. 
At the center of this family of feelings and related cognitive states is the 
experience of freedom that one can have about the future of one’s own life not being 
fixed or determined. The sort of freedom that I am concerned with here differs from 
the sort of freedom that is a prerequisite for moral responsibility: it is the freedom of 
one’s actions and ideas arising out of oneself without being fully determined by the 
external world or by one’s own preexisting commitments and beliefs. This experience 
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is often (but not always) associated with the free play of one’s decision-making 
powers, when one can “pick” what to do rather than choosing in a manner that is 
determined by prudential or moral reasons (cf. Ullmann-Margalit & Morganbesser 
1977). I take it as a premise that the experience of freedom is valuable, in that it 
provides an independent source of intrinsic value.6 
While I focus on experiences of freedom in the following discussion, I do not 
mean to confine my discussion to suggest that games do not actually provide their 
players with a form of freedom when they play. Indeed, when I write about 
“experience of freedom,” I am concerned with veridical experiences: experiences that 
players have because there is some respect in which they are free rather than illusory 
experiences. The reason I focus on experiences of freedom rather than freedom itself is 
because I aim to describe a feature of games that players actively value and take 
pleasure in. Thus, I am interested in the freedom of games that forms part of players’ 
conscious experience of playing them, rather than in any sort freedom that game 
players might have without being aware of it. 
3.2 Freedom and the Concept of a Game 
Games provide their players with the experience of freedom in two respects. First, as 
paradigmatically voluntary and unnecessary activities, games provide their players 
with the experience of undertaking a purely optional activity. As noted above, Suits 
defines a game as the “voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 
1990, 41). There is one sense in which playing a game is always something done for a 
further reason: to spend time to with friends, to solve a puzzle, to provoke 
conversation, to stave off boredom, and so forth. But there is another sense in which 
players accept the rules of a game for the sole purpose of making the game possible. 
The activities that a player performs within a game’s “magic circle”—the lusory space 
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that players enter into when they play a game—are subject to constraints in the form 
of rules that are adhered to just to make the game possible (Huizinga 1950, 10). I might 
play a game of go in order to spend time with a friend and exercise my spatial 
reasoning skills. As we play, when I place a stone, I do so in pursuit of the end of 
accumulating points by capturing my opponent’s stones and securing space that my 
opponent cannot productively invade, which is the end that I adopt to make playing 
the game possible. I do not independently care about the arrangement of stones on a 
go board; I care only because I have taken up the pre-lusory aim of securing space on 
the go board in order to make playing the game possible. (In other words, for me to 
win, I must secure more space than my opponent does.) If I am really playing the 
game, then I will not deviate from the rules of go, even if I think that doing so might 
better achieve out-of-game values that I care about (Suits 1990, 145). Where I place my 
stones is not determined by what best allows me to exercise my spatial reasoning 
skills; rather, it is determined by the rules of go and my aim of winning the game.7 
In the pure sense of game-playing that concerns Hurka and Suits, playing 
games is necessarily experienced by players as non-obligatory: “Game-playing must 
have some external goal one aims at, but the specific features of this goal are 
irrelevant to the activity’s value, which is entirely one of process rather than product, 
journey rather than destination” (Hurka 2006, 229). This view is also taken by 
philosophers who reject attempts to precisely define games and adopt more bottom-
up approaches to classifying activities as games.8 As Roger Caillois, a proponent of a 
pluralistic approach to characterizing games, notes, if playing were obligatory, “it 
would at once lose its attractive and joyous quality as diversion” (Caillois 2001, 9). 
Thus, if I am engaged in an activity that is recognizable as “playing a game,” I am 
engaged in an activity that I do not have to do, and that I regard as such (and 
professional gamers are not “playing a game” in this strict sense unless they are 
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playing, at least in part, “just for fun”). In this respect, an experience of freedom 
arising from the free play of my decision-making powers is characteristically 
provoked by the playing of any activity recognizable as a game. 
Games are not the only activities that provide the experience of undertaking a 
purely optional activity. Play more generally provides an experience of activity that is 
intrinsically and non-instrumentally valued and that is fully voluntary (Tasioulas 
2006, 244), as do activities of aesthetic appreciation and creation. Games are a 
distinctive form of play in that they are undertaken for non-instrumental reasons but 
also incorporate instrumental activity: players make “moves” like placing a go stone 
for the instrumental reason that those moves contribute to the end of winning. This 
distinctive form of play is also distinctively valuable. In our everyday lives, when we 
exercise our decision-making powers in the context of instrumental activity, it is only 
rarely that we experience the completion of activity initiated by our decision-making 
powers because the valuable instrumental ends that we pursue take so long to achieve 
and are so complicated that it is very hard for us to know when or if we have achieved 
them. (Consider the activity of “saving Venice’s canals.” Have the canals been 
“saved”? How could we know? The scope of potential risks to the canals is mind 
boggling.) 
In games, we have the opportunity to see our decisions through to the end of 
the game, achieving or failing to achieve the lusory goal (winning) and the pre-lusory 
goal (the state of affairs that counts as winning, like putting my opponent into 
checkmate in chess) that we set out to achieve not because of their value but just to 
make the game possible. Games thus provide a distinctive experience of the free 
exercise of our decision-making powers in instrumental activity that is not provided 
by life outside of the magic circle: they provide an opportunity to frame our use of 
practical reason with the attitudes and dispositions characteristic of play. If the 
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category of “games” is co-extensive with the category of play-activity that has an 
instrumental structure, as Suits believes (Suits 1990, 90), then games also provide a 
distinctive experience of the free exercise of our decision-making powers in 
instrumental activity that other forms of play do not provide.9 
3.3 Freedom and the Experience of Playing Games 
In addition to the experience of freedom of playing that games provide, many 
successful games provide their players with an experience of freedom in playing. 
When playing games, I do not invariably experience the actions that I take as part of a 
game to be unconstrained nor do I experience the possible paths that the game will 
follow as undetermined. For instance, if I know enough and am good enough at 
checkers, I might play a game of checkers and feel that every move I make in the 
game is determined by transparent considerations about which move is optimal, given 
the objective of winning.10 I play the game voluntarily and regard my playing of 
checkers as non-instrumental, but, provided that I am committed to trying to win the 
game, the possibility space for my in-game decisions is narrowly circumscribed: I 
must make the single move that seems most likely to result in winning the game. 
Likewise, “grinding” in computer games, where I repeat the same tasks over and over 
to advance characters or access new content, does not, in itself, provide me with an 
experience of freedom (although in the space of a game, it might serve an 
instrumental purpose of making an experience of openness possible once the grinding 
is complete and my character has “leveled up”). 
However, in many or most successful games, I also have an experience of 
freedom as I make decisions within the game. For instance, when I play Pictionary, I 
have an experience of freedom in deciding how to illustrate words that I want my 
teammates to guess, because there are many different approaches that I might take to 
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drawing these words and phrases. And if I know how to play checkers but my 
knowledge of checkers falls far short of understanding its solution, I might also have 
this experience, because multiple moves or strategies appear “eligible” given my 
objective of winning. (Although whether I have an experience of freedom when I play 
checkers with imperfect knowledge rather than some cognate experience, like 
indecision, may depend on other features of my psychology and the context in which 
I’m playing the game. Am I “fooling around” or am I desperately trying to win, 
frustrated by my inability to discern the optimal move?11) Thus, the sense of freedom 
that I am interested in can arise from epistemic difficulties: my ignorance of the 
solution to checkers makes it possible for me to experience my decisions about how to 
move my pieces as relatively unconstrained by instrumental rationality. 
Games exploit a variety of formal techniques that provide their players with 
such experiences. These techniques include structuring the play of the game to 
provide an openness of the development of narratives, an openness of strategy or 
decision-making, and an openness of the objective of the game itself. I will address 
each of these techniques in turn. 
First, narrative-rich games, in which much of the experience of playing the 
game consists in assembling a story from plot elements provided by the game, often 
provide their players with an experience of freedom about the direction in which the 
narrative will develop. For instance, games featuring “emergent narratives” in which a 
player “imagines or ‘authors’ the story by playing in a world she actively constructs,” 
like Sim City and Civilization, provide their players the opportunity to shape the 
storyline of the game in a variety of directions at the player’s own discretion (Brand & 
Knight 2005, 4). Other games, including massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games (“MMORPGs”), provide their players with the opportunity to shape the stories 
within the game that they participate in by enabling them to control their self-
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presentation through avatars and characters. Many MMORPGs provide their players 
with the ability to interact with other players anonymously or pseudonymously, 
which enables players to present and explore identities (relatively) un-tied to their 
real-life identities. While such exploration can be misogynistic and racist (Rohwer 
2014), some participants experience the opportunity for make-believe as freeing them 
from out-of-game identities that they wish to escape or that they wish felt less 
constricting. For instance, sociologists contend that anonymity and pseudonymity in 
MMORPGs like World of Warcraft enable some players to explore non-normative 
sexuality through erotic role-play by contributing to the insulation of the game from 
“real life” (Brown 2015, 67). Games need not provide anonymity or pseudonymity for 
such experiences to arise. As Shannon Mussett has argued, the opportunity for 
imaginatively shaping an identity and a narrative in role playing games like Dungeons 
& Dragons “can allow for players to explore the intricacies of gender and sexuality in 
creative and potentially radical ways” (Mussett 2014, 189). Narrative openness 
provided through emergently structured narratives and self-presentation allows 
games to provide some of their players with an experience of freedom about the 
stories that they participate in and create while playing. 
Second, games of sufficient complexity often provide their players with an 
experience of the openness of strategy or freedom of in-game decision-making. Many 
successful games provide their players with multiple, equally eligible routes to 
winning. For instance, “deck building” games in which players construct decks out of 
a large number of cards that perform different functions, like Hearthstone and Magic: 
The Gathering, provide players with many different ways to put together a deck, each 
of which is (roughly) equally compatible with the goal of winning the game. Similarly, 
games like chess and go provide a wide variety of competitive openings that players 
can choose between; deciding which sort of opening to use in a game of chess will 
 14 
often be driven by considerations about which strategy is most likely to result in 
winning the game, but because there are often multiple openings that appear about 
equally competitive to the player, this decision might also reflect considerations about 
style, or which opening is more fun. (As with decisions in checkers, whether the 
opportunity that these games provide actually eventuates in an experience of freedom 
depends on the abilities of their players, how much the players know, and the context 
in which they are playing the game.) Other games provide additional strategic 
decisions embedded in the game that players can make in a variety of ways each of 
which or many of which ways are compatible with winning the game. The open 
texture of play in a game provides players with an experience of freedom about their 
own decisions and about the states of affairs that will obtain in the game until it 
concludes. 
Third, some games provide their players with an experience of openness about 
the objective (or the “prelusory goal”) of the game itself.12 For instance, “sandbox” 
games—games that provide players with the ability to move freely through virtual 
worlds, like Minecraft—might be played by different players with different objectives 
and different understandings of what it would mean to “win” the game. In playing 
such a game, one can have an experience of freedom, or of the possibility of deep or 
ironic reflection, about the activity they are engaged in. A player might determine that 
they are, or should be, engaging in a fundamentally different activity from the one 
they were engaged in when they started playing the game. A game’s openness about 
the goal of playing can provide players with a experience of freedom that is broader in 
scope than the experience of freedom about strategic choices because it enables 
players to freely pick which of a number of strategies they will pursue, given the aim 
of winning the game by bringing about a particular state of affairs, but also to freely 
pick what states of affairs they will attempt to bring about in playing the game.  
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The formal techniques that games exploit demonstrate that many, but not all, 
successful games provide the experience of freedom to their players as they play them. 
Some players seek out this experience when they decide what game to play, though 
for other players this experience may simply be a side effect of entering into the 
lusory space of a game. (Other players might play games in spite of this experience if, 
for instance, they want an activity to occupy their time but wish that they did not 
have to make any discretionary decisions.)  
I understand the experience of freedom provoked by successful games as a 
narrower version of the attitude that artists have toward creative artworks of genius. 
In Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant argues that “one cannot learn to write 
inspired poetry, however exhaustive all the rules for the art of poetry and however 
excellent the models for it may be” because “no Homer or Wieland can indicate how 
his ideas, which are fantastic and yet at the same time rich in thought, arise and come 
together in his head, because he himself does not know it and thus cannot teach it to 
anyone else either” (Kant 2000, 5:309). When artists cannot fully explain why they 
constructed their poems or sculptures as they did, this reflects their tendency to 
regard their art-making decisions as not exhausted by their own determinate concepts 
but as also reflecting an engagement with their own ideals or their own immediate 
experience of the world in a manner that cannot fully be captured in their existing 
conceptual repertoires. Feeling that there is some part of me that is ineffable, that I 
cannot know until it comes to the surface, so that even I might be surprised by who I 
am and what I will do, is part of the experience of freedom associated with truly 
creative artworks. Similarly, games that provide for the experience of freedom in 
playing provide the opportunity to play in a manner that cannot be fully explained by 
the rules of instrumental rationality about how best to win. 
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While games often provide their players with an experience of freedom, they 
do so through the strategic use of constraints in the form of rules. Constraints in the 
form of rules that players follow in order to play a game provide the scaffolding for 
the more complex experiences of freedom that their players can have. I agree with 
Hurka that part of the value of games is the complexity that they lend to otherwise 
simpler activities. If I sit down in front of a go board with a pile of stones and no rules 
to follow, there might be some sense that whatever activity I undertake is more “free” 
than the activity of playing go, constrained by the game’s rules. But while it is 
conceivable that I might do something complex and interesting with them, more likely 
than not I will just idly arrange the stones, ending up engaging in a much less 
complex and interesting activity than I could with the scaffolding of the game’s rules. 
Because both insufficient and excessive complexity can undermine players’ ability to 
be interested in a game, rules seek to calibrate the complexity of a game so that the 
players neither master the activity with tremendous ease nor find the activity so 
bafflingly difficult that they are unable to make any headway. The experience of 
freedom that games provide is a valuable experience of freedom within a structure, 
where the free play of one’s decision-making powers is constrained by rules that make 
the activity more complex and therefore more intrinsically valuable. Such rules make 
game-playing and the accompanying experience of freedom possible while at the same 
time narrowing the possible scope of this experience. 
3.4 Style: An Objection 
It may be objected that what is valuable about games, beyond their complexity and 
difficulty, is not that they provide an experience of freedom but rather that when 
playing them their players actually are free.13 Perhaps what is valuable about the 
openness provided by games is not the psychological experience of feeling that one’s 
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decisions are not narrowly constrained when one plays, but the other goods that 
players can achieve when they are able to make unconstrained decisions. When 
players are actually free, they are able to play with individual style, where their style is 
an expression of their ideals for how the game should best be played (Riggle 2015, 
728).14 For instance, a player might seek to play a game in a way that expresses their 
ideal of playing elegantly, aggressively, obtusely, or zanily. In playing with style, 
players have no occurrent sensation of freedom, because they are guided by and aim 
at expressing their ideals. The objection continues, it is this possibility of playing with 
style, in a way that uniquely reflects the player’s individual ideals, that really makes it 
valuable to play games, rather than the bare experience of freedom. 
My response to this objection comes in two parts. First, I accept that, in 
addition to the sensation of freedom that games often make available to their players, 
the fact of the freedom that games provide and those further goods that players are 
able to accomplish in virtue of having such freedom are also valuable. The further 
value of the freedom that games provide to their players does not diminish the value 
of the experience of freedom that the games that I have described provide to their 
players.  
Second, the experience of freedom that I have described does not need to be 
explicitly and consciously conceptualized as one of freedom by players who 
experience it. The experience of freedom involves occurrent psychological states, 
which sometimes take the form of an explicit feeling that one is free to act as one 
picks but which can also take the form of a feeling that I and my discretionary powers 
can make a difference to how things will turn out or an awareness that how things 
will go is not determined in advance by rules, my instrumental rationality, or external 
forces. In this broad sense, experiences of freedom are compatible with feeling that in 
playing I am expressing my ludic ideals of how a game should be played, provided 
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that I take myself to have discretion in determining how to act out my ideals. When 
the experience of freedom is understood in this way, this experience is a prerequisite 
for the expression of style in playing a game. It is only by having this experience, 
including some occurrent awareness of the openness of one’s circumstances in a 
game, that a player can uniquely express their ideals through play, for it is only when 
one is aware that it is possible to do so that it makes sense to shape the circumstances 
in which one finds oneself to express one’s ideals for oneself, as a person or as a game 
player. The good of “playing with style” is not an end that the experience of freedom 
aims at and achieves, but a good that is made possible by experiences of freedom in 
games that contributes to the intrinsic value of such experiences.15 
We should think of the value of playing with style not as a rival to the value of 
the experiencing freedom in playing, but as a correlative: games whose rules shut out 
the everyday world of human action and practical rationality both provide players 
with the distinctive sort of freedom that allows for exercises of style and allow players 
to experience themselves as free.16 Whether the experience of freedom that players 
have is about the shape of the narrative that they create through the game, the 
strategic decisions that they make while playing, or the objective of the game, the 
freedom that games provide in playing gives players the experience that how they 
play will reflects something unique about them as individuals. Some games, like tic-
tac-toe and snakes and ladders do not afford any discretionary control to players, and 
even some games that do provide discretion to players might not allow much room for 
individual flair. When I play chess, for instance, I see most of the moves that I should 
make as determined by the situation that I am in, rather than by my own sensibility. 
The parallel between freedom and style thus elucidates the difference between the 
experience of freedom and the cognate experience of discovery. Sometimes I do not 
antecedently know what move to make, but once I settle on the right move it seems to 
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arise inevitably from my circumstances. Making such discoveries may require 
creativity but it does not allow for the discretionary expression of my ludic ideals 
because the move I make is fully dictated by features of my situation. Games that do 
not allow for the manifestation of style in their play do not provide players with the 
core experience of freedom about how things will go in the game. How best to play to 
win might be encapsulated in a game’s constitutive rules, but how to play with style 
cannot be. 
4. Complexity versus Freedom 
I have argued that all games provide their players with an experience of freedom that 
derives from participating in a paradigmatically optional activity that one need not 
undertake, that many games provide their players with the experience of freedom as 
they play the game, and that players often value this experience.17 It remains to be 
seen whether this conflicts with the difficulty view of the value of games. In this 
section, I argue that appreciating this form of success for games requires modifying 
Hurka’s view. While I share John Tasioulas’s worry that the difficulty view’s focus on 
admiration and achievement risks “the invasion of play by the rhetoric of 
achievement” (Tasioulas 2006, 251, quoting Christopher Lasch), I accept Hurka’s view 
that the value of games is a value of “process rather than product, journey rather than 
destination” (Hurka 2006, 229). I disagree, however, that this value must come from 
the structure of game-activity, as Hurka proposes. The intrinsic value of the “process” 
can also come from the mode in which the activity of game-playing is pursued, and 
playing games in such a manner as to provide an experience of freedom is a source of 
intrinsic value. This source of intrinsic value is not an end aimed at and achieved, like 
saving Venice’s canals or overthrowing a tyrant; it also is not a feature of the 
organization of sub-activities into more complicated and difficult activities. Games can 
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have intrinsic value by conducing to the experience of engaging in activities in such a 
manner as to generate an experience of freedom without having this as their aim, and so 
games are valuable in a different dimension than difficulty or complexity. 
Hurka’s view conflicts with the view that I have developed here when Hurka 
contends that “game playing … cannot have the additional intrinsic value that derives 
from instrumental values” (Hurka 2006, 233). As explained above, for Hurka, games 
cannot be more valuable than equally complex non-game activities because the nature 
of games is that they do not aim at any valuable instrumental ends (which, at least 
when they are achieved, add to an activity’s intrinsic value). For Hurka, the difference 
between games and non-game activities is that games cannot aim at any external good 
(because if they did, they would not be undertaken simply for their intrinsic value) 
and so cannot have as a source of value the aiming at and achievement of valuable 
ends that contribute to the (intrinsic) value of instrumental, non-game activities. This 
excludes the possibility that part of the value of games lies in the experience of 
freedom that they provide to their players. By its nature, playing games does not aim 
directly at producing this experience. However, while players cannot directly aim at 
this experience, a consequence of playing games is that players (at least often) have an 
experience of freedom. I have argued that one source of games’ intrinsic value is the 
effect that they have on their players’ experiences even when they are not undertaken 
with the immediate aim of generating this effect. Indeed, they generate this effect in 
part because they are undertaken without any immediate instrumental aim. I therefore 
disagree with Hurka’s view that an activity can have intrinsic value either because it 
aims at and achieves good consequences or because of its internal structure; I contend 
that an activity can also be valuable in virtue of the psychological experiences that it 
generates in its participants without aiming to do so. Games produce such experiences 
precisely by not aiming at some further value.18 
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Thus, less complex games can, in one important respect, be more valuable than 
more difficult or complex games. Consider the role-playing game The Quiet Year. In 
this game, players define the struggles of a post-apocalyptic community by drawing a 
map and telling stories about it; the action of the game lasts for a year, at the end of 
which “the Frost Shepherds will come, ending the game,” with no further specification 
of who the Frost Shepherds are or what this rule means (Alder 2013).19 Most people 
will, I think, intuitively regard The Quiet Year as significantly less difficult than chess, 
whether because there are fewer “moves” to organize hierarchically to achieve the 
goal of winning or because it takes less effort to play. However, The Quiet Year 
provides an experience of freedom that chess does not because it makes use of all 
three of the formal techniques of promoting an experience of freedom that I have 
described: it enables players to assemble a narrative of their choosing from the plot 
elements of the game, it provides openness of strategy in formulating what the post-
apocalyptic community will do, and it provides players an opportunity to decide for 
themselves what objective to pursue within the game. On my view, it is a game that is 
less difficult than chess but that provides a greater experience of freedom than chess, 
and to that extent has more intrinsic value. 
Some people, including Hurka might resist this claim, since successfully 
playing The Quiet Year requires assembling a complex narrative, and the complexity of 
the storytelling that it requires may be just as great as the complexity of chess.20 If this 
view is correct, my discussion here shows not that The Quiet Year is less difficult than 
chess but good in a different dimension than difficulty but instead shows that The 
Quiet Year, while as difficult as chess, is also good in a different way. Games’ non-
instrumental framing of instrumental activity reliably gives rise to a pleasurable and 
valuable experience of freedom. Games are valuable, in part, because of the framing 
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that players engage in while playing them. A game need not be maximally difficult in 
order to generate a maximally free experience of playing. 
Hurka might also reply that he recognizes that playing games “can still contain 
… the distinctively modern good of achieving a goal regardless of its value” (Hurka 
2006, 234). However, the “distinctively modern” value of game playing has to do not 
only with achieving a good “regardless of its value” but also with undertaking an 
activity simply because one has settled on doing so, e.g., playing a games “for the fun 
of it.” Having fun is not the same as just undertaking intrinsically valuable activity—it 
is undertaking unnecessary intrinsically valuable activity. In everyday life, as we 
instrumentally pursue ends that we value we must attend to the many effects, 
intended and unintended of our decisions. Our ability to exercise our practical reason 
is often constrained by the high stakes that attach to our decisions—the risks of 
harming other people or treating them immorally. “The pressure to do things that 
really matter, with all the attendant difficulty, risk of failure, and uncertainty 
involved, can be burdensome”  (Scheffler 2013, 57). Will trying to save Venice’s canals 
have unintended effects on housing prices? Will it distract from other, more valuable 
projects?  
In playing a game, we can focus on the distinctive pleasure of unconstrainedly 
exercising our power to decide what to do, because the downstream effects of our 
decisions terminate at the edge of the magic circle, at least as long as players do not 
exhibit the failure characteristic of being a “bad sport,” where players do things as part 
of a game that have effects that cannot be effectively cabined in the space of the game. 
Games provide an opportunity to exercise our practical powers in a low-stakes 
environment with relative impunity to their global consequences, freeing us from the 
anxiety that our decisions will “mess things up” in a big way. Games can be fun and 
 23 
valuable because they provide an experience of purely optional activity, where we 
always get to exercise our power to set up ends for ourselves when we are not 
required (even by our own lights) to set up those ends.21 
5. Games and Politics 
The advantages that arise from the sort of freedom afforded by playing games extend 
beyond the immediate experience of that freedom. Games can provide a limited model 
of what experiencing the future of one’s life as open, rather than closed, is like more 
generally. In lives where possibilities are closed off, games can model the experience 
of a freer sense of life. (Their ability to do so depends on who is playing the game and 
the context in which they play.) Is playing a good game merely a relief from work or 
tedium or is it something more intrinsically valuable than that? Samuel Scheffler 
argues that some people take pleasure in playing games because “it can come as a 
relief to pretend that things matter when they don’t” (Scheffler 2013, 57). But in the 
best moments playing a game can do more than this, reminding its players of how 
open life can be, even in the ethically imperfect world that they inhabit. 
Furthermore, the experience that games provide of arbitrarily exercising one’s 
decision-making powers may serve useful ethical purposes. The experience of freedom 
in games is close to the experience of choice that liberalism makes available to 
consumers. In Michel Foucault’s view, the principal variety of “freedom” provided by 
European governments to their citizens beginning in the 18th century is the freedom 
to make decisions as individuals that are not prescribed or dictated by governmental 
regulations but that, at the level of a population produce predictable and manageable 
results (Foucault 2008, 59-61). The freedom of liberal capitalism “is much more the 
spontaneity, the internal and intrinsic mechanisms of economic processes than a 
juridical freedom of the individual recognized as such” (Foucault 2008, 61). Both games 
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and liberal capitalism provide an opportunity to experience the free play of one’s 
decision-making powers, whether or not that experience corresponds to any 
meaningful sense in which the future of one’s life is actually open. Thus, Foucault 
describes the economic capitalism sanctioned by liberal capitalism as “the game of 
freedom and security” (Foucault 2008, 65). As I argue elsewhere, if laws or regulations 
are designed to provide such an experience, we might worry that those laws “mask” 
their own political effects, forestalling political efforts to change them (Gingerich 
2016, 102). Games, in contrast provide a site where players can experience the 
pleasure of freedom where it does not matter whether this experience is “real.” In 
games, this experience is provided by rules that players voluntarily adopt for non-
instrumental reasons, rather than by laws that are coercively imposed. By providing a 
context in which what matters is artificial, games allow for the experience of freedom 
connected to instrumental activity without allowing the pleasure of this experience to 
interfere in our engagement with politics. 
6. Conclusion 
Hurka locates the value of games in their complexity: for him games are less valuable 
than equivalently complex non-game activities that aim at and achieve instrumentally 
valuable ends. I have argued that games paradigmatically provide access to the good 
of the experience of freedom for their players, and that while games do not aim at this 
good, it is still part of the intrinsic value of the activity of game playing, and so that 
Hurka’s account of the source of games’ value must be modified. Following optional 
rules for non-instrumental reasons provides a distinctive experience of discretionary 
action free from the constraints of reasons and duties. Games are valuable in part 
because they provide an opportunity for the free play of our decision-making powers. 
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Notes 
1. Not everyone accepts this view of professionals. For an argument that professional players 
should have a place in Suits’s utopia, see Kolers 2016. Bradford does not directly address 
the question of professional players but appears to agree with Hurka (Bradford 2015, 
184). 
2. Bradford provides a fuller account of why difficult activities are valuable: engaging in 
difficult activity (for her, activity that requires intense effort) is an exercise of the will, 
and exercising the “will to power” to overcome resistance or obstacles is a perfectionist 
capacity, which is intrinsically valuable (Bradford 2015, 120-21). 
3. Bradford’s view is similar, although she is less concerned to compare games to non-game 
activities than is Hurka. For Bradford: (1) games are valuable because they transform less 
difficult activities (that require less intense effort) into more difficult activities (that 
require more intense effort), (2) more difficult games (that require more intense effort) 
are better than less difficult games (that require less intense effort), and (3) games gain 
further value because they pursue an intrinsic good (of effort) for its own sake (Bradford 
2015, 182-84). 
4. My view here accords with C. Thi Nguyen’s view that playing a game involves entering a 
special motivational state that is distinct from the ends of playing a game (Nguyen 
2017a, 136), as well as with Bradford’s view that achievement sometimes requires not 
aiming directly at the ultimate end of an activity (Bradford 2015, 193 n.17). 
5. John Tasioulas develops a related argument against Hurka, arguing that that primary 
intrinsic good of games does not have to do with achievement but instead with play, 
which is a basic good, like friendship, enjoyment, and knowledge (Tasioulas 2006, 243). 
For Tasioulas play is free activity that is separated from ordinary life, ordered by rules 
and expectations, valued for its own sake, enjoyable, and socially acknowledged as 
valuable (Tasioulas 2006, 244-47). My account diverges from Tasioulas’s in two respects. 
First, Tasioulas criticizes Hurka’s view by rejecting his definition of games (Tasioulas 
2006, 237). Unlike Tasioulas, I contend that even if we accept Hurka’s definition, his 
account of games’ value is problematically incomplete. Second, Tasioulas’s account is 
designed to show how “a large number of everyday instances of game playing” of games 
that are not remotely complex or difficult, like bingo and snakes and ladders, might have 
significant intrinsic value (Tasioulas 2006, 248). My account is designed to provide an 
adequate foundation for answering evaluative questions about particular games—which 
games are more valuable and which less so—and does not aim to describe most everyday 
instances of game playing as valuable. Some games provide greater freedom than other 
games and, for that reason, are more valuable as games. In my view, games like bingo 
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and snakes and ladders provide—at least for adult players—no or almost no experience of 
freedom. 
6. Whether experiencing the sort of freedom that I have described here is in fact an 
independent source of value is a complex question that I explore elsewhere (Gingerich 
2018). My reliance on this premise here is reasonable because, as the discussion that 
follows in this section demonstrates, designers and players of games regard the 
experience of freedom as valuable, both for the particular pleasure that it can occasion 
and as a source of fun and excitement. I address in section 3.4 the objection that what is 
valuable about games is simply the freedom that that they provide to their players and 
the other goods that having such freedom makes possible rather than the experience of 
freedom itself. 
7. I discuss below those games that provide more “space” to their players to make decisions 
that are not fully determined by the set of the game’s rules and the player’s objective of 
winning. Thanks to a member of the Editorial Board for helping me to clarify my 
description of go. 
8. For this reason, while I accept Suits’s definition of games for the purpose of my argument, I 
do not think that my argument’s success depends on accepting his definition. 
9. For a perspicacious account of how the distinctive pleasure of games is associated with the 
opportunity to engage in practical reasoning for its own sake rather than for any 
instrumental end, see Nguyen 2017c. 
10. Checkers is “solved,” in that perfect play by both players leads to a draw (Schaeffer et al. 
2007). 
11. Thanks to Calvin G. Normore and Stephanie Patridge for raising this point. 
12. Other games provide a different, more minimal, experience of freedom by promoting 
uncertainty about their outcomes. Virtually all games that it makes sense to play “for 
fun” provide either an experience of openness about their objectives or an experience of 
uncertainty about their lusory outcomes. Typically, I am uninterested in playing games 
in which I know to a certainty that I will win or lose before I begin playing. I might play 
a game that I know I will lose to help learn the rules, to teach someone else how to play, 
or to learn how to play better, but more typically, I want to have a chance of winning. At 
the very least, it is important that I not know in advance exactly how I will lose. 
13. Thanks to C. Thi Nguyen for pushing me to address this objection. 
14. Nick Riggle’s account of style as an expression of one’s ideals is constructed as a theory of 
“personal style”—a way of living a life that expresses one’s ideals about how to live—that 
Riggle then extends to “artistic style”—a way of creating art that expresses one’s ideals 
for artistic creation (Riggle 2015, 729). I here extend Riggle’s notion of personal style to 
“ludic style”—a way of playing a game that expresses one’s ideals for game-play. 
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15. Those who reject Riggle’s view that style involves the expression of one’s ideals and think 
that style is the potentially involuntary reflection of one’s personality, traits of mind, and 
character (Robinson 1985, 229), or who think that one’s ludic ideals can be expressed 
without the exercise of any discretion, will be unmoved by the second part of my reply 
to the objection. But the first part of my reply still stands. 
16. This claim is a general one: I do not mean to deny that there are some games that provide 
players with a “phony” experience of freedom that does not correspond to really being 
free and some games that provide players with an opportunity to play with style without 
providing any subjective experience of freedom. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
helping me to formulate the connection between “actual” freedom and “experiences” of 
freedom. 
17. As noted at the outset of § 3, this claim is confined to the narrow sense of game-play 
adopted by Hurka and by Suits in his description of utopia. Many professional games 
with substantial real-life consequences provide their players with, at most, a very limited 
experience of freedom. (Insofar as professional games qualify as real Suitsian games, 
however, they will provide their players with some limited experience of the freedom of 
playing described in § 3.2.) 
18. Bradford thinks that “it’s not the needlessness that’s doing any of the work in making” 
games into valuable activities (Bradford 2015, 96). For this reason, her view of the value 
of games should also be amended, for, as I have argued, the needlessness of games is, 
indeed, part of what makes them valuable activities. However, unlike Hurka, Bradford 
acknowledges that the value of achievements can be enhanced by factors that are not 
essential to achievements, including by goods that activities achieve without directly 
aiming at them (Bradford 2015, 133, 193 n.17). She also acknowledges that there may be 
other perfectionist capacities beyond those that she focuses on—will, rationality, and 
physical capacity (Bradford 2015, 149). Thus, while Bradford’s version of the difficulty 
view is vulnerable to the same criticisms as Hurka’s version, Bradford’s version can be 
amended more easily to accommodate the value of the experience of freedom. 
Particularly, I think that Bradford could and should recognize spontaneity as a 
perfectionist capacity, because it is characteristic of humans and worth developing, but I 
leave aside my argument for this claim for another time. 
19. Thanks to C. Thi Nguyen for introducing me to this game. 
20. Bradford persuasively argues that Hurka’s view that difficulty arises from complexity 
should be rejected because there are many complex but non-difficult activities—
particularly, communication—which is extremely complicated but does not require 
intense effort (Bradford 2015, 34). Bradford’s account thus provides a better explanation 
of why The Quiet Year is less difficult than chess. (Because Bradford’s account of intense 
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effort is agent-relative, we would need to know more about who is playing to conclude 
that one or the other of the games is more difficult. For a player with extreme social 
anxiety, The Quiet Year might take much more intense effort than chess.) 
21. Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for raising this point. 
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